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The influenza pandemic of 2009 revealed shortcomings in the existing guidelines for risk and outbreak
communication. Concepts such as building trust proved hard to achieve in practice, whereas other issues such
as communicating through the internet and coping with the political fallout of disease outbreaks are not dealt
with in existing guidelines. This article surveys the current guidelines and makes recommendations for
additional tools and guidelines to be developed in four areas: integrating long-term behavior change models
with outbreak communications; research to develop a better understanding of communicating through the
internet; research to understand how to use communications to build trust; and developing guidelines and
principles to understand the political nature of disease outbreaks.
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O
n April 24 2009, the World Health Organiza-
tion(WHO) announced that a previously unde-
tected swine origin influenza virus was causing
outbreaks of disease among humans in Mexico and the
United States. By the end of August 2010, when the
WHO declared the pandemic over, the new virus had
spread to more than 214 countries and territories and
caused at least 18,449 laboratory confirmed deaths (1).
Given that many countries did not have the capacity for
laboratory confirmation of deaths or even cases, the
number of deaths worldwide is estimated to be signifi-
cantly higher. In the United States alone, one study has
estimated over 12,400 deaths from the new virus (2).
The pandemic was a testing time for the field of risk
and emergency communication. Although communica-
tions tools and guidelines to deal with disease outbreaks
exist, the scope of the pandemic threw up challenges that
demonstrated both the usefulness of existing tools and
concepts as well as an understanding of their limitations.
If one of the aims of communication is to build common
understanding between health agencies and the public,
then low-vaccine uptake, allegations of collusion between
health agencies and the pharmaceutical industry, and
allegations that the pandemic was a ‘fake pandemic’
reflected failures in communication. As one commentator
noted, existing communications guidelines and practices
might require ‘some pivotal adjustments’ after being
tested during the pandemic (3).
This article reviews existing tools, principles, and
guidelines for communication during pandemics and
other disease outbreaks and looks at the gaps in theory
and practice that the pandemic has revealed.
In particular, it examines four questions:
1) Do existing health risk communication tools, which
were designed to meet the needs of disease outbreaks
of relatively short duration, work for an event as
long and complex as a pandemic?
2) What do health communicators need to understand
about communicating through a medium as inter-
active and dynamic as the internet?
3) Trust is key principle in risk communications, but we
live in what has been characterized as a post-trust
society (4). How are public health agencies and
governments to build trust in this context?
4) Pandemics and other serious disease events are
political, social, and economic events, in addition
to being public health events (5). What are the
key issues that communicators need to understand
about the sociopolitical environment in which
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communication occurs? In particular, what can we
learn from sociological and cultural scholarship into
risk perception?
1. Integrating risk and emergency
communication with health communication
The two main sources of guidelines and practices for
communicating during pandemics and infectious diseases
outbreaks are the World Health Organization’s Outbreak
Communications guidelines (6) and the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention Crisis and Emergency
Risk Communication guidelines and training module (7).
These guidelines are very focussed on emergencies and
outbreaks and the special challenges of communication
during a period of ‘uncertainty, confusion, and a sense of
urgency’ (6), and communicating effectively ‘under nearly
impossible time constraints (7).’
The focus on emergencies and crises arose out of
specific needs: the experience of SARS, the anthrax
attacks in the United States, and the heightened focus
on bioterrorism led to the creation of tools and guidelines
for situations where health communicators would find
themselves as part of a crisis and emergency response (8).
However, an influenza pandemic is more than an
outbreak. It begins as an outbreak when the new virus
first emerges and starts causing disease at the community
level. It then spreads globally over an extended period of
time, causing different levels of disease at different places
at different times. If the virus is unstable, then patterns of
severity could also change with time and location, and
changes in the virus could see a pandemic lasting for
several years.
The 2009 pandemic showed that communication needs
changed over time. The initial need was for clear
communication on what the public needed to do to
reduce transmission as well as advice on treatment. But as
the pandemic progressed, this changed to more complex
questions such as the necessity for vaccination and
vaccine safety, the need for continued vigilance as well
as questions about the quality of the public health
response to the pandemic, and questions of account-
ability, cost, and so on.
These issues were no longer within the realm of
emergency or even risk communication. They were rather
part of long-term health communication and health
promotion, focusing on behavior change in areas such
as cough etiquette, hand hygiene, and in wealthier
societies on regular vaccination for influenza.
Although there are a variety of approaches to health
communication, from the more traditional forms used in
the western world, to more participatory, grassroots-
based approaches that are often more effective in the
developing world, these have never been integrated with
risk and emergency communication. The WHO has its
outbreak communication guidelines for emergencies, but
it also has a communication for behavioral impact model
for health communication and behavior change. This
model has used to support leprosy control campaigns in
India and Mozambique, dengue prevention in Malaysia,
TB prevention in Bangladesh, and Kenya and in other
places (9). The United Nations Children’s Emergency
Fund and the World Bank have advocated similar social
mobilization communication strategies (10). Other parti-
cipatory communication programs for HIV/AIDS have
also been described in the literature (11).
During the pandemic, a survey of the needs of
developing countries conducted by the WHO and other
UN agencies showed many developing countries found
communicating at the community level a problem and
were requesting support for planning for behavior change
communication at the community level (12). This was not
an area covered by the existing outbreak and risk
communication guidelines.
There, therefore, appears to be merit in trying to
combine the longer term, participatory health commu-
nication approaches with the more short-term commu-
nication principle for disease outbreaks and emergencies,
into a broader framework for strategic communication
for disease outbreaks.
2. Understanding and effectively using the
Internet
This was the first pandemic of the internet age, and it was
clear that the web and web-based tools including social
networking tools provided valuable channels for commu-
nicators to reach audiences.
However, the internet is a challenging medium to use.
The internet is unique because it erases the formal
distinction between communicator and audience. The
creation of blogs and other user-generated content has
turned the internet into a conversation space in which
everyone can participate, erasing the distinction between
expert and lay person, and has created a space in which
everyone can publish their opinions and views.
Unlike traditional top-down communication from ex-
pert to audience, the internet provides ‘alternate lines of
knowledge circulation,’ where websites and blogs also
challenged assessments by experts and authorities (13).
Through web sites and blogs, the internet has created a
network of virtual communities based on shared interests
and values, who communicate among themselves. For
example, during the pandemic, environmental and sustain-
able development groups critical of factory farming
created alternative narratives of the pandemic as a
consequence of modern farming. (14). Groups suspicious
of modern businesses and their influence on politics
created narratives in which the pharmaceutical industry
influenced perceptions of the seriousness of the pandemic
(15).
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Existing risk communication guidelines do not pro-
vide guidance or principles on the best way to use the
internet, particularly social networking tools such as
Facebook and Twitter during disease outbreaks as well
as for longer health crises. This is clearly an area where
evidence-based guidance needs to be developed.
3.Creating trust in a post-trust society
Being regarded by the public as trustworthy is a basic
component of risk communication. The WHO and US
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
emergency and outbreak communication guidelines are
based on building a relationship of trust between com-
municator and audience. Without this trust, the like-
lihood of the public being persuaded to follow guidance
diminishes (16). But, it has been pointed out that public
trust in policy makers and officials is declining, at least in
western societies. The sociologist Ragnar Lofstedt de-
scribed these societies as post-trust societies (4). There is
little literature on trust in government in developing
societies, or societies with different social and political
systems, but it is reasonable to assume that low trust in
government and institutions is not a purely western
phenomenon.
A range of factors have been described in the literature
as components of trust. Renn and Levine proposed
competence, objectivity, fairness, consistency, and good-
will as making up trust (17). Peters, Covello, and McCal-
lum proposed knowledge and expertise, openness and
honesty, and concern and care as the constituents of trust
(18). Lofstedt proposed fairness, competence, and effi-
ciency as the components of public trust.
It is not clear how these various components are to be
communicated to the public to build trust. Risk and
outbreak communication principles describe displaying
empathy with the public and being open and transparent as
factors to build trust. But are empathy and transparency
sufficient to communicate the varied components of trust
listed in the literature? Lack of trust can flow from avariety
of factors: lack of belief in the competence and knowledge
of authorities, lack of belief in their fairness, lack of belief
in their honesty, and so on. The reasons for lackof trust can
vary from situation to situation. It is possible to conceive of
a situation where lack of trust is based on the perception
that the authorities have knowledge and competence, but
are not fair and another situation in which the authorities
are perceived to be fair and honest, but lack competence. In
addition to a general policy of openness and transparency,
it is important that communication be addressed to the
specific causes for low trust.
Establishing trust is a complex process that requires
more than applying guidelines such as openness and
transparency (19). A research agenda for risk communica-
tion needs to understand the trust building process better
and offer insights from the published literature in various
disciplines, as well as suggest new areas for study.
4.The political, social, and economic
environment of risk communication
As has been noted earlier, infectious disease outbreaks
and other health emergencies are highly charged political
and social events (5). Communicating during such events
is rarely a simple matter of communicating information
clearly and transparently and winning public trust. More
often than not, the issues are surrounded by political and
economic overtones, requiring political decisions that can
create controversy. To take an example, decisions over
vaccine procurement, travel restrictions, and other public
health measures, all have economic and political con-
sequences, and therefore those who communicate about
these issues find themselves confronting questions that
are not essentially about health but about other aspects of
society.
Therefore, health risk communicators need to draw
insights from sociological and cultural studies of risk. The
work of the German sociologist Ulrich Beck offers insights
into the social and political basis of risk that can offer
insights for the communication of risk. In his pioneering
work on the Risk Society, Beck described the distribution
of technological and other risks produced through the
process of modernization as a major preoccupation of
modern governments and societies (20). This distribution
of risk is never equitable but follows the unequal distribu-
tion of power in national societies as well as global society.
The struggles over the distribution of risks are a major
reason for the differences in the scientific or expert views of
risk and the views of different sections of society.
To take an example, a farmer with an outbreak of H5N1
in his farm needs to cull his chicken and ducks if the
outbreak is to be curtailed. From the farmer’s point of
view, though, he is being asked to bear the cost of
destroying his livelihood in order to reduce the risk to
other members of society. He could well see himself as
bearing a disproportionate level of risk, and his compli-
ance with health messages would depend on the extent to
which these messages also address the larger issues at the
back of the farmer’s mind. In this case, the level of
compensation for bearing this risk to his livelihood would
be a key issue to address if there is to be compliance.
Therefore, what might seem a simple public health issue
has complex roots in areas that lie outside health, and there
is a need to develop tools and ideas that help to deal with
these complexities.
Communication during a health emergency or crisis
often gets bogged down in questions of blame. Although
communicators try to provide the public with information,
the public, and very often the media, seem more interested
in attributing blame. Mary Douglas’ cultural anthropolo-
gical work has led her to describe risk in modern society as
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being part of a politicized ‘blaming system.’ ‘Whose fault?’
is the first question. ‘Then, what action, which means what
damages, what compensation, what restitution?’ Risk thus
‘becomes a stick for beating authority (21).’
Based on this, it is necessary for health communication
guidelines and principles to be broadened so that they
equip communicators to address the underlying social and
political questions about blame and risk distribution that
are on the public mind during disease outbreaks and
emergencies, and to have the tools to be able to respond to
these queries.
Toward a research agenda for communication
Following from the earlier discussion, it is suggested that
the tools and principles of risk communication be
expanded in the following areas:
1) The integration of communications tools and guide-
lines for long-term behavior change and social
mobilization, especially in developing country set-
tings, into the existing guidelines for outbreak
communication.
2) Based on case studies of the experience of the
pandemic as well as other disease outbreaks, gui-
dance on how to use the Internet, including social
networking tools effectively to provide the public
with health guidance.
3) Understanding how to build and maintain trust with
the public before, during, and after disease out-
breaks.
4) Guidance on how public health communicators can
understand and negotiate the political and cultural
complexities of pandemics and other disease events.
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